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ABSTRACT: Chinese and western philosophies tend to give different answers 
to is/ought relation. The disputes provide a broader vision to make a re-
exploration into the old and fruitful question. Clear distinctions between 
the subjective fact judgment and the objective fact, between the subjective 
value judgment and the objective value are the prerequisite. A subjective fact 
judgment, an is statement, consists of two elements: the judging person or 
power, and the judged object, i.e. the objective fact. It is the judged object 
itself that works as the criterion for the true or false of the fact judgment. A 
subjective value judgment, or an ought statement, consists of three elements: 
the judging person or power, the judged object or the objective fact, and 
the third element, which is something other than the judged object and 
works as the criterion for the making of the good or evil judgment. The third 
element in the value judgment is the core in the is/ought distinction and also 
the source of ought. Further analyses into the third elements under different 
types of value judgments show that this source of ought is fundamentally 
and essentially factual. The relation of fi tness objectively existing between 
the judged object and the third element is found to be the ultimate factual 
foundation of value judgment. A fi nal reunifi cation of is and ought is achieved 
at the factual relation of fi tness while the difference between is/ought lies only 
in the perspectives to depict the relation. So, fundamentally, ought can only 
be derived from is while the good fl ows from the truth. Such a conclusion 
accepts the Chinese connection thesis between is and ought, but rejects its 
emphasis of good over truth. 
Key words: Is/ought, two-element judgment/three-element judgment, the 
third element, truth/good.
1PhD in Law, Edinburgh University, UK. Researcher, Junyang Legal Translation & Research, China. E-mail: 
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RESUMO: É tendência das fi losofi as chinesas e ocidentais darem respostas 
diferentes à relação ser/dever ser. Essas disputas fornecem uma visão mais ampla 
para que seja possível reexplorar a velha questão de maneira mais frutífera. 
Distinções claras entre o juízo da realidade subjetiva e objetiva do fato, entre o 
juízo do valor subjetivo e valor objetivo são os pré-requisitos. Um juízo subjetivo 
do fato, uma declaração afi rmativa, é constituído por dois elementos: a pessoa 
ou poder de julgar, e o objeto julgado, ou seja, o fato objetivo. O objeto em si 
funciona como o critério de verdadeiro ou falso para o julgamento do fato. Um 
juízo de valor subjetivo, uma declaração imperativa, consiste em três elementos: 
a pessoa ou o poder de julgamento, o objeto julgado ou o fato objetivo, e o 
terceiro elemento, que é algo diferente do objeto julgado e funciona como 
critério para a tomada de juízos bons ou maus. O terceiro elemento do juízo 
de valor é a essência da distinção is/ought (é/deve) e também a fonte do que 
convém. Outras análises sob diferentes tipos de juízos de valor mostram que 
essa fonte deveria ser fundamentalmente e essencialmente factual. A relação 
de adequação objetiva existente entre o objeto julgado e o terceiro elemento é 
considerada como o último fundamento factual de juízo de valor. A reunifi cação 
fi nal é e deve ser feita em relação factual de aptidão enquanto a diferença 
entre elas é/deve ser reside apenas nas perspectivas para descrever a relação. 
Então, fundamentalmente, ought só pode ser derivado de is enquanto o bem 
fl ui da verdade. Tal conclusão apoia a tese do conexionismo chinês entre is e 
ought, que objetifi ca a verdade sobre o bem. 
Palavras-chave: ser/dever, juízo de dois elementos/juízo de três elementos, o 
terceiro elemento, verdade/bem.
Is/ought conflict as a cultural conflict
The world today is a world of cultural confl icts. Cultural confl icts appear in 
many forms. They can be different morals, confl icting religions, and even disputing 
philosophical conceptions. For example, an old philosophical question known to 
western philosophers as fact/value dichotomy has had quite different forms and 
different answers in China. In the West, David Hume makes the distinction between 
is and ought. According to Hume (1978), ought, the value judgment about virtue 
or vice, is substantially different from is, the fact judgment about true or false. 
Ought cannot be derived from is, as ought is not something rationally conceivable 
like is. Since Hume (1978) there have been probably three core points in Western 
philosophical tradition concerning the fact/value problem: (i) distinction: ought and 
is are essentially different; (ii) disconnection: ought cannot be derived from is; (ii) 
rationality controversy: whether or not ought can be rationally conceived. 
The fi rst point maintaining that fact and value are different has rarely been 
challenged.2 The second point about the disconnection has not been much doubted 
either within the western tradition. Finnis (1980, p. 33-34), though disagreeing 
with Hume (1978) about whether values are rationally conceivable, holds the say 
idea in terms of the disconnection between ought and is: “(Oughts) are per se nota 
(self-evident) and indemonstrable. They are not inferred from speculative principles. 
They are not inferred from facts. They are not inferred from metaphysical propositions 
2 Though some later philosophers in the west do think it not appropriate to absolutized the dichotomy between 
fact and value but still maintain the distinction between the two. Hilary Putnam, from the United States, for 
example, claims the collapse of fact/value dichotomy. However, Putnam (2006, p. 10-11) makes clear distinction 
between the two terms of “dichotomy” and “distinction”, by which he rejects the “absolute dichotomy” as 
useless and a failure but takes “distinction” as the proper description of the relation between fact and value.
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about human nature, or about the nature of good and evil, or about ‘the function 
of a human being’, nor are they inferred from a teleological conception of nature 
or any other conception of nature. They are not inferred or derived from anything”. 
Disconnection thesis may be taken as the characteristic mainstream idea of western 
philosophy concerning fact/value relation. 
But the third point concerning the rational inconceivability of value judgment 
has always been a center of controversies. Immanuel Kant, though played an 
important role in the evolution of the idea of the fact and value dichotomy, was 
thought to disagree with Hume in that Kant holds that moral propositions can be 
rationally defended and the whole Kantian moral philosophy could be taken as an 
explanation about why so. John Finnis as well claims that when discerning what is 
good, intelligence is operating in a different way, yielding a different logic, from 
when it is discerning what is the case (historically, scientifi cally, or metaphysically); 
but there is no good reason for asserting that the latter operations of intelligence 
are more rational than the former.
Without the clear-cut conceptualization in the west, fact/value problem has 
been discussed in quite different forms in classical Chinese philosophy and has 
involved some quite different conclusions. However, there is an agreement between 
Chinese and western philosophies on the basic distinction between fact and value. 
The traditional ⶹ (knowing) and 㸠(doing) distinction is an example, which, though 
not equivalent to fact/value dichotomy, has covered in some degree the substance 
of it. The distinctions made between Ўᄺ (knowledge) and Ў䘧 (Tao) by Lao-tzu3, 
㾕䯏Пⶹ (knowledge of the seen and heard) and ᖋᗻ᠔ⶹ (knowledge of virtue) 
by Zhang Zai4, ᠔ҹ✊ (what makes things what they are) and ᠔ᔧ✊ (how things 
should be) by Chu Hsi5, etc. have also covered one way or the other the current 
fact/value dichotomy. According to Graham’s interpretation, Chu Hsi’s SUO YI RAN 
(what makes things what they are) refers to the matters of fact while SUO DANG 
RAN (how things should be) the values. These might be an example that the absence 
of a fact/value or is/ought dichotomies does not refl ect a lacuna in Chinese thought 
and that the substantial question has been explored but in different terms or forms 
from the west (Graham, 2007, p. 277).
Since Chinese philosophy also recognizes the distinctions between the two, 
the inter-relation is therefore discussed. But striking differences arise here. While 
disconnection is the mainstream conception in the west, Chinese philosophy tends 
to hold the connection thesis that fact and value, instead of disconnected, are 
internally connected with each other. Chinese philosophy is characterized with its 
ideas on the internal connections between dichotomies6. The basic notion of ໽Ҏড়
ϔ(the oneness of the nature and the human) lays down the fundamental principle 
to connect human affairs with the physical. Zhang Dainian (1982, p. 7) takes ϔ໽
Ҏ(the oneness of the nature and the human), ড়ⶹ㸠 (the unity of knowing and 
3 As interpreted by Fung Yulan, Ўᄺ (WEI XUE) and Ў䘧 (WEI DAO) are distinguished in the Chinese 
philosophical tradition that WEI XUE is to pursue knowledge while WEI DAO is to pursue virtues or moral 
values (Fung Yulan, 2001, p. 4-5).
4 According to Zhang Dainian (1982), the seen-heard knowledge is about physical things, and not the knowledge 
of virtue while the knowledge of virtue is not developed from the seen-heard knowledge (㾕䯏ПⶹЗ⠽Ѹ㗠
ⶹˈ䴲ᖋᗻ᠔ⶹˈᖋᗻ᠔ⶹˈϡ㧠Ѣ㾕䯏Ǆǉℷ㩭g໻ᖗǊ).
5 According to Chu Hsi (1989), each of the things in the world must have its reason that makes it what it is 
and its rule of how it should be (“㟇Ѣ໽ϟП⠽ˈ߭ᖙ৘᳝᠔ҹ✊ПᬙˈϢ݊᠔ᔧ✊П߭ˈ᠔䇧⧚гǄǉ
໻ᄺ៪䯂Ǌोϔ). With the former knowledge, people will not be ignorant while with the latter, people will 
not act wrongly. (ⶹ݊᠔ҹ✊ˈᬙᖫϡᚥǄⶹ݊᠔ᔧ✊ˈᬙ㸠ϡ䈀Ǆǉ᰺ᒉܜ⫳ᴅ᭛݀᭛䲚Ǌो݁कಯǉ
ㄨ៪ҎϗǊ).
6 Like those of Ϟϟ (the up and the down), ݙ໪ (the in and the out), Ҏ៥ (the self and the other), ᑑᯢ (the 
dark and the light) etc. (Zeng Chunhai, 2009, p. 28). 
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doing), ৠⳳ୘ (truth-good integration) as the fundamental character of classic 
Chinese philosophy which demonstrate an opposite doctrine from the western in 
terms of fact/value relation.
This is not yet the end of the Chinese-Western dispute on fact/value problem. In 
contrast with the western controversy on whether oughts can be rationally conceived, 
Chinese philosophy, with its connection thesis, has come into an argument about the 
relative importance of the connected fact and value, which weighs more. Traditionally 
Chinese people tend to take the value judgments as the more signifi cant part. Some 
philosophers like Xunzi7, Wang Yangming8 etc. emphasize the priority of action 
to knowledge, which in some degree implies priority of value to fact. Some more 
recent philosophers like Liang Shuming (2005), Fung Yulan (2001), Mou Zongsan 
(1997), and other Neo-Confucianists claim that Chinese culture is good-oriented in 
contrast with the truth-oriented western one, showing the emphasis of value over 
fact in Chinese culture. 
There is also opinion in Chinese philosophy to put fact over value. In The Great 
Learning (ǉ໻ᄺǊ), for example, all the value judgments like 䆮ᛣ (sincering the 
thoughts)ǃℷᖗ (rectifying the heart), ׂ 䑿(cultivating the person), 唤ᆊ(regulating 
the family), ⊏೑(governing the state), ᑇ໽ϟ(harmonizing the world) are internally 
connected with Ḑ⠽ (investigating or approaching things) and thereafter 㟈ⶹ
(complete or arriving at knowledge). Ḑ⠽and 㟈ⶹas interpreted by Chu Hsi mean 
arriving at knowledge by approaching things9. Wang Yangming, following Chu’s 
teaching, tried to arrive to the ultimate virtues by approaching bamboos (Ḑネ). 
When western-originated modern physics fi rst came to China, it was named as Ḑ
㟈. Thus, according to this understanding, value is not only connected with fact, 
but even takes fact as its foundation10. 
In terms of fact/value problem, we have now found two signifi cant differences 
between Chinese and western philosophies: connection versus disconnection, 
good-oriented versus truth-oriented. Modern neo-Confucianism gives an expanded 
interpretation of this philosophical problem from a broader cultural perspective, 
saying that Chinese culture is a good-oriented one while the western truth-oriented. 
Such a conception is fairly popular in today’s China. Some Chinese people feel sad 
about it. They think the emphasis on the value part has led to the neglect of the 
fact part. This is why China, as a cultural defi ciency, has not developed a tradition 
of science (Mou Zongsan, 1936). Though western people cannot get an agreement 
on the rationality of value judgments, they seldom doubt the rationality of fact 
judgment but highly value the rational fact judgment and hammer at them. This is 
thought to be the precious cultural superiority that has fostered the modern science, 
which Chinese people envy so much. 
Some others do not feel so pessimistic. They take the good-oriented feature 
of Chinese culture as superiority rather than inferiority, thinking this might mean 
7 According to Xunzi (XUNZIgQUANXUE), “One cannot know the height of the sky unless he is on a mountain, 
one cannot know the depth of the earth unless he is by a river” (ϡⱏ催ቅˈϡⶹ໽П催г˗ϡЈ⏅⑾ˈϡⶹ
ഄП८гǄǉ㤔ᄤgࡱᄺǊ) . Therefore, knowing comes from doing. 
8 According to Wang Yangming (CHUANXILU), “As for all the learnings in the world, none can be said to be a 
learning without doing” (ሑ໽ϟПᄺˈ᮴᳝ϡ㸠㗠ৃҹ㿔ᄺ㗙ǄǉӴдᔩgोЁǊ).
9 There are controversies about the meanings of Ḑ⠽and 㟈ⶹ in Chu Hsi’s interpretation whether things 
refer to physical world or social behavior and whether knowledge refers to that of fact or that of ultimate 
values (Zhang Taiyan, 1995, Ā䇌ᄤ⬹䇈ā).
10 Graham (2007, p. 277) was sort of puzzled with Chu Hsi’s “᠔ҹ✊”Ϣ“᠔ᔧ✊”. As he takes the former 
as the matter of fact and the latter the imperative, Graham thinks they are totally two different kinds of 
problems, which cannot be confused and united, and it is wrong derive imperative from the premise of pure 
fact. However, neo-Confucianism does indeed combined the two together and therefore causes a severe 
problem in the eyes of the westerner.
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that traditional Chinese morals have inherently greater good and could point out the 
possible way for mankind out of the world-wide spiritual crisis (Cheng Chung Ying, 
1998, p. 283-284). Another conclusion that fl ows from this good/truth-orientation 
is the incomparability of Chinese and western cultures. Often when confronted 
with political or moral confl icts with the west, some Chinese would claim that there 
is no good or bad between us because we are essentially different cultures (Fang 
Zhaohui, 2002, p. 151-200). 
This philosophical problem refl ects in itself a cultural confl ict. However, this 
problem may also be helpful with the solution to cultural confl icts in general. 
The most important part of cultural confl icts is value confl icts, and value or the 
root of value is the core of the fact/value dichotomy. If we could achieve better 
understanding of how a value comes, there should be a better chance for us to 
settle the most severe part of cultural confl icts. So, further exploration into fact/
value dichotomy is valuable. And this exploration could be more fruitful as we are 
no longer seeing the problem from Chinese or western point of view alone. We 
have both, a broader vision. 
Is/ought reinterpreted: Two-element/three-
element judgments
At the start of the exploration, it is important to make clear the distinction 
between the subjective fact judgment and the objective fact, between the 
subjective value judgment and its objective reference. The objective fact is the 
autonomous existence out there for people to perceive while the subjective fact 
judgment is the content of such perception. The objective reference of a value 
judgment is the autonomous existence out there for people to perceive while 
the subjective value judgment is the content of such perception. A subjective 
fact judgment or value judgment is often expressed with a statement, which is 
linked by is or ought. Therefore Hume’s is/ought dichotomy represents subjective 
fact and value judgment, not the objective fact and the objective reference of 
value judgment. 
Whether or not a fact judgment could be made depends on two things: 
fi rst, the object to be judged; second, the judging power or device. Once we 
have the object of judgment and power of judging, then we will have the fact 
judgment. For example, we can make a fact judgment of a fl ower: “This is a 
fl ower”. Tree is the judged object of the fact judgment, plus the judging person 
(power), the two elements are necessary and also suffi cient for the making of 
fact judgment.  
A fact judgment is about what the judged object is. What is signifi cant with 
a fact judgment is whether or not the subjective judgment indeed successfully 
refl ects what the object really is. If it does, we use a positive term for the successful 
judgment, calling it as true. If it does not, we use a negative term for the unsuccessful 
judgment, call it as false. So a fact judgment is called true/false judgment. The 
critical point is that the criterion to decide the true or false of a fact judgment is 
the judged object itself, not anything beyond the judged object. Therefore, a fact 
judgment (F) consists only of two elements: judging power (P) and judged object 
(O), with O itself as the criterion for the true of false of the judgment. Hence we 
call fact judgment as two-element judgment. 
A value judgment is not about is but about ought, not about true or false 
but about good or bad. For example, “It is a beautiful fl ower” or “He ought not to 
lie”. In the making of such judgments, we certainly need the judging powers (P) 
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and the judged objects (O). Flower and conduct to lie are the judged objects in the 
above examples respectively. However, only two elements of P and O are not likely 
to be suffi cient. A third element is necessary for the making of value judgment. 
This is because a value judgment is about the good or bad of the judged object 
and the judged object cannot be the criterion to decide the good or bad of itself. 
We need something beyond tree or the action of lying to decide whether they are 
beautiful or not, good or evil. 
For example, you stand before a fl ower with your judging power but with no 
feelings about it nor any criterion external to the fl ower itself, or you are confront 
with a lie but with no moral or any criterion external to the action of lying itself, 
then you cannot say whether the fl ower is beautiful or ugly, whether the action of 
lying is good or bad. You simply cannot make any value judgment about it at all, and 
the best thing you can do is to make a fact judgment: “It is a fl ower”, or “He lies”. 
You must have something other than the judged object. So, an external criterion 
(C) is essential for the constitution of a value judgment. While fact judgment is 
constituted with two elements of P-O, value judgment must have three elements, 
P-O-C; hence the name three-element judgment. 
Therefore, as the criterion for good/bad judgment, it is the third element that 
decides what the value judgment would turn out to be. Why the third element is 
so important? Actually, the value judging process resembles using a measurement 
to measure the judged object. The third element is right the measuring meter. And 
the so-called value you make is just the degree of the judged object’s fi tness with 
the third element. If the judged object fi ts in with the third element, we would use 
the positive terms on it, such as good, virtue, beautiful etc. If the judged object 
does not fi t in with the third element, we would use the negative terms on it, such 
as evil, vice, ugly etc. 
If the criteria are different, the value judgments made would be different 
even about the same judged object. For example, given your judging power and 
the action of lying, you would decide that you ought not to lie to your girlfriend 
because you have sworn that “I will never lie to you” while some other time you 
decide that you ought to lie to her because you make her happier by doing so. It is 
the same judging power of yours, and it is the same action of lying, but you have 
got totally different value judgments. And the only reason is that the third elements, 
the criteria, are different. 
Now we arrive at the constitutive difference between fact and value judgments: 
the two-element and three-element structures. The internal structural distinction 
is essential and signifi cant, which can clear away many more problems concerning 
fact and value judgments. First, the ways to make fact and value judgments cannot 
be substituted for each other. That is, one cannot expect to make a proper fact 
judgment through the process of value judgment making; and one cannot expect 
to make a proper value judgment through the process of fact judgment making. 
If, for instance, one wants to make a value judgment and hopes to do it with only 
two elements of P and O, unfortunately, as previously said, the judgment thus made 
can only be that of fact instead of value. If one hopes to make a fact judgment but 
with a third element external to the judged object, unfortunately, the so-claimed 
fact judgment should be false in principle. This is because the true or false of a 
fact judgment is decided by the judged object per se as the criterion, and, with the 
third element external to the judged object, it is a wrong criterion and accordingly a 
false fact judgment. So a true fact judgment must necessarily be free from the third 
element, while the third element, as the inherent birthmark of value judgment, could 
be the distinguishing symbol of value from fact. “Value-free” is indeed a marvelous 
expression of English language to show the nature of fact judgment. 
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The second point is about the comparison and communication of different 
fact or value judgments. If there are confl icting fact judgments about the same 
judged object, they would have a common objective criterion to decide which is 
true and which is false. And this is the judged object they share. Thus, though the 
fact judgments are confl icting, they are at least comparable, and have the common 
ground to communicate and the chance for harmonization.
Confl icts of value judgments are a quite different case. Given two value 
judgments about the same judged object but with different third element, the value 
judgments will naturally confl ict each other, and the confl ict will be irreconcilable. 
If P1 makes a value judgment V1 (I ought not to lie to my girlfriend) about object O 
(action of lying) upon the third element C1 (because I have sworn not to) while P2 
makes a value judgment V2 (I ought to lie to my girlfriend) about object O (action 
of lying) upon the third element C1 (because that makes her happy), logically, P1 
cannot disclaim V2 while P2 cannot disclaim V1. Because V1 and V2 are based on totally 
different criteria of C1 and C2, they thus have no tertium comparationis.
If the two value judgments insist on disclaiming each other, they are not doing 
anything meaningful. Actually, they are making a new value judgment with the other 
value judgment (V1 or V2) as the object and their won third elements (C2 and C1) as 
the criteria. The problem is that each is using his own criterion as the ultimate that 
allows no further analytical consideration while at the same time gives absolute 
denial of the other party’s criterion. Thus, the value confl icts will be nonnegotiable 
and irreconcilable. For example, the judgment of “Polygamy is right” based upon 
Islamic Koran confl icts with the judgment of “Polygamy is wrong” based upon 
Christian Bible. While both parties claim that the religious foundation is ultimate 
and not negotiable, there would be no chance to harmonize the confl ict. 
Thirdly, since the elements of P-O and P-O-C are the necessary and suffi cient 
conditions for the making of fact and value judgments respectively, it depends totally on 
the judging person’s will which judgment - fact or value - he feels like making once the 
conditions are met. For example, when you stand before a fl ower with happy feelings 
about it, you can either say: “It is a fl ower”, or “It is a beautiful fl ower”, whichever you 
like. Thus, the judged object, as long as it exists there and within the judging power 
of the judging person, is subject to both fact and value judgments. It is the judging 
person’s decision which judgment to make and the judged object plays no part in it. 
Fourthly, though we can still use Hume’s is and ought to symbolize respectively 
fact and value judgments, we must however be aware that the two link verbs are 
just formal symbols and do not mark the essential distinction between fact and 
value judgments. For example: “This is a beautiful fl ower” has the verb is in the 
statement, but it is a value instead of a fact judgment. The concepts of two and 
three-element structures are the only way to locate the distinction in nature between 
fact and value judgment, with which the linguistic symbols of is and ought do not 
have any necessary connection. 
Finally, the structural distinction between fact and value judgments should 
have proved the signifi cance of itself, and a further illustration of this might therefore 
be welcome. I am sorry if it irritates those who hate the so-called scientism, but a 
wonderful analogy is indeed able to be made between the structural distinctions 
of is/ought and the molecular structures of different physical substances. Why are 
water and alcohol different? According to science, it is because of their difference 
in molecular structure: H-O-H and CH3-CH2-OH. Why are fact and value judgments 
different? Similarly, we can say it is because of their difference in the inner structure 
as well: P-O and P-O-C. Even, to the greater wrath of the already wrathful anti-
scientists, we might say we have found the molecular structure of morality: P-O-C. 
Of course, it needs to be refi ned, but not within this short paper.  
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The third element 
As previously said, if the value confl ict stems from the different third elements 
they have, and people refuse any further negotiation about the third elements, it will 
be impossible to have any comparison and communication between the confl icting 
value judgments. The only way to harmonize this part of cultural confl icts is to allow 
further exploration into, instead of the value judgments per se, the third elements 
of them. Also, the third element is what makes value judgment as it is, marking its 
special essence from fact judgment. The sort of molecular or even atomic analysis 
into the third element will be helpful with deepening our understanding of value 
judgment. 
Considering human emotions or inclinations as the third element, one can 
say that this is the most typical case in which the western philosophy disconnects 
value judgment from rational fact judgment. Why Hume (1978, p. 256-457, 470) 
maintains that ought cannot be derived from is, because, as he claims, ought is 
derived from a kind of sense or feelings, which is something human reason cannot 
capture. Finnis defends for the rationality of value judgment, but he takes the basic 
forms of good grasped by practical reasoning as what is good for human nature, 
and maintains that one grasps the good from the inside in the form of inclination. 
“One does not judge that ‘I have [or everybody has] an inclination to fi nd out 
about things’ and then infer that therefore ‘knowledge is a good to be pursued’. 
Rather, by a simple act of non-inferential understanding one grasps that the object 
of the inclination which one experiences is an instance of a general form of good, 
for oneself (and others like one)” (Hume, 1978, p. 470) Thus, value judgments 
are not derived from fact or anything but from the self-evident and internally-felt 
inclinations or ultimate values. 
Though the two disagrees on its rationality, they both take basic human 
feelings or inclinations as the source of value judgment, which demonstrates value 
judgment’s disconnection from fact judgment. However, given a second thought, 
these emotion or inclination arguments are not so sound. First, Finnis seems to 
have a possible risk of self-contradictions. His “non-inferential understanding” 
that motivates one to grasp the object of inclination as an instance of a general 
form of good may have two possible interpretations. These internal experiences of 
inclination directly trigger the action for the objective of the inclination. One does 
not have cognitive perception or judgment about the fact that I have an inclination 
to fi nd out about things, this inclination alone generates from the inside the external 
reactions to fi nd out about things. If so, the process is not only non-inferential, it is 
not through the human reason or human mind at all. It is just like refl exive process 
of any animal that motivates it to grasp his food or mate, which does not seem to 
have much to do with human reasonableness. Such an interpretation would confl ict 
with Finnis’ defense for the rationality of value judgment. Besides, with such an 
interpretation, the good thus obtained is often not good even by the criterion of 
the inclination’s objective itself. For example, if one has dermatophytosis, he would 
experience the internal inclination to scratch to stop the itching. However, as it is 
known, the more he scratches, the worse the itching, which is just the opposite of 
the inclination’s objective. 
The other possible interpretation is that, though there is no inference process, 
rational knowledge about the inclination is indeed there. Probably, there is no explicit 
form of word or inference process of formal logic for the judgment that I have an 
inclination to fi nd out about things. But the fact that I have an internal need for (the) 
knowledge must be within my rational perception. That is, though with no wordy 
form, I have perceived in a special way the factual existence of the inclination, and 
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it is only upon this perception of the fact of the existence of my need that I act to 
fi nd out about (the) thing(s). Thus understood, the so-called internal experiences of 
inclination are in essence the rational and cognitive perception of fact, that is, the 
existence of my internal need for knowledge. And this fact judgment is working as 
the third element for my value judgment of knowledge. Accordingly the inclination-
to-practical reasoning process is one from is to ought. This second interpretation 
actually means that the value judgment that ‘knowledge is a good to be pursued’ 
is not directly resulted from the pure inclination or emotion alone, but from the 
fact judgment of the inclination or emotion, whatever form it takes. 
If the second interpretation is right, then only on the basis of true fact 
judgment about the inclination can proper value judgment be made. Otherwise, even 
when the inclination is there inside me, if I have made a false fact judgment about 
it, I cannot make a good value judgment. As a matter of fact, this claim has been 
evidenced by the author’s own experiences of hunger. Hunger as the inclination for 
food is the feelings of the need for food, including the emptiness of the stomach. 
However, the author used to have severe gastritis. When my stomach was empty, I 
felt the pain instead of the normal feelings called hunger. At the time, the right thing 
for me to do was to eat so as to stop the pain. Unfortunately, at the beginning of 
the disease, I did not know it was the emptiness that caused the stomachache but 
worried that if I ate the food would hurt the stomach worse. So I decided not to eat. 
Clearly I made a wrong value judgment and the wrong value judgment is derived 
from a false fact judgment that I have made about the feelings of the emptiness 
of the stomach, or the feelings of hunger. So feelings or inclinations alone are not 
enough, fact judgment must be involved for a proper value judgment. 
Some may argue that the pain I felt is not hunger while hunger refers only 
to the normal feeling of the need for food, which is instinctively pointing to the 
action of eating. But this argument actually equals human inclination to animal’s 
instinctive neural refl ex, with no human reason involved, which, as previously said, 
would contradict Finnis’ defense for the reasonableness of value judgment. Thus 
hunger shall refer to the feelings of the need for food instead of a special kind of 
the feelings. 
A more plausible understanding might be like this. The need for food is 
an objective and factual state while the feeling of hunger is just one form of the 
perceptions of this fact. People’s perceptive device is composed of many parts and 
sense is one of them while reason is another. When one perceives the factual need 
of food in a sensual way, the perception he gets might be the feeling of hunger11. 
In this sense, hunger is also the fact judgment about the objective need for food, 
not with human reason but with human sense. A healthy person’s sensual fact 
judgment, the inclination of hunger, might probably be suffi cient for the action to 
eat. However, at least for a sick person like the author, sense alone cannot make a 
true fact judgment of the need for food, and reason must be involved for a sound 
base to make proper value judgment. 
Thus understood, when a value judgment is thought to be derived from 
feelings or inclinations, it is in fact derived from fact judgment. Though the is-to-
ought process is not inferential, fact judgment is still internally connected with value 
judgment as the foundation for the latter. When the foundational fact judgment 
is not true, the value judgment will accordingly be not as good. Human cognitive 
devices may work in different ways: either from outside or from inside, either in 
form of reason or in form of inclination. But a principle seems to remain: value 
11 Of course, reason alone can also cognize the factual need for food without the sensual aid. For example, 
by the time of gastric emptying, blood sugar and other modern medical methods. 
242
Filosofi a Unisinos, 10(3):233-253, set/dez 2009
Xiangyang Qian
judgment is derived from fact judgment. The good fl ows from the true. The greater 
the truth; the greater the good. 
Assuming sheer fact judgment as the third element, one can say that the 
above conclusion, though plausible in case of emotions or inclinations as the third 
elements, is fairly non-traditional. It is against the disconnection thesis of western 
philosophy though in agreement with the connection notion of the Chinese. And 
within Chinese philosophical tradition, this conclusion is also the minority in claiming 
an is-to-ought sequence instead of otherwise. It therefore needs to be further 
testifi ed. However, we can sometimes fi nd easy examples in which value judgments 
are derived from obvious fact judgments. 
For instance, right after an international event occurs, a government 
spokesman is asked to give comments on it, which is the value judgment of the 
event. Often the spokesman might say: “No comments”, or “I am not yet authorized 
to comment”, or “I will get back to you later”. Days or weeks later, the spokesman 
announces the attitude of his government towards the event, either to support or 
condemn or keep a neutral position. What happens in the days or weeks? Usually 
it is the process of fact judgment making. That is, the nation’s government is trying 
to locate where the nation’s interests lie about the event. Only after they have 
the proper knowledge about the fact of what the national interests are, can the 
government make their value judgment about the event, can the spokesman go 
away from “No comment” to “Comment”. 
In his Treatise, Hume (1978) has noticed the role of is in ought. He mentioned 
the improper or erroneous actions caused by the false fact judgments of passions, 
apples etc. But he maintained that all these errors in fact judgments do not make 
the according actions immoral and therefore moral virtue or vice cannot be derived 
from is (Hume, 1978, p. 459-463). Hume has actually confused different levels of 
value judgments here, which we will discuss immediately in the following section. 
Whether an action to reach out for an apple is moral or not is a value judgment 
in itself, with the action as the judged object and a criterion about morality as the 
third element, while the action to reach out for the apple is another value judgment, 
with the apple as the judged object and the judging person’s desire as the third 
element. They are two different value judgments. 
The action to reach out for an apple as a value judgment must based on the 
apple as the judged object and the person’s desire as the criterion. However, as 
Hume (1978) has noticed, if the judging person has got false fact judgments about 
the apple and about the desire, the value judgment will be based on a complete 
falsehood of fact judgments. The apple here is the judged object, which both fact 
and value judgments need. If in a value judgment, a true fact judgment about the 
judged object is also necessary because the misperception of the judged object will 
not lead to proper value judgment. That is you will fi nd the apple is not what you 
expected, and the value judgment you made is a failure. So even in terms of the 
judged object, fact judgment seems to be the foundation of value judgment. Let 
alone the third element, without true information of which the value judgment made 
must be an erroneous action (Hume, 1978, p. 460). At the level of the action, the 
falsehood of fact judgment is obviously the source of the badness (negativeness) 
of value judgment. It proves, instead of Hume’s disconnection thesis, but the 
connection thesis that fact judgment is the basis of value judgment, that the good 
fl ows only from the true. 
Moreover, the third element can be considered as the value judgment itself 
since the third elements in some value judgments are not human emotions or 
inclinations, not obvious fact judgments, but also values. For example, John loves 
to drink. However, he restrains himself before he drives and says: “I ought not to 
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drink and drive”. “Why?”, asks Ed. That is, Ed wants to know the third element in 
John’s value judgment. “Because the law says so”, replies John. So the third element 
in John’s value judgment that “I ought not to drink and drive” is the law, which 
is also a value judgment. If Ed keeps on asking “Why does the law say you ought 
not to drink and drive?”, John may answer “Because drinking alcohol increases the 
chance of traffi c accident”. This is to a large extent a fact judgment.
In this case, where the third element C1 in value judgment V1 is another value 
judgment, we can trace down into the value judgment of V2 (C1) to fi nd out its third 
element C2. If C2 is still a value judgment, we can keep on going so as to fi nd out its 
C3. The rest could be concluded this way. We will fi nally fi nd that the third element 
Cn in the value judgment V n is a fact judgment. 
This analytical tracking tells us two things. First, one value judgment may be 
based on another value judgment as its third element while it can also work as a 
third element to make further more value judgments. All these value judgments are 
related with each other but they are totally different value judgments. A division of 
level or hierarchy is necessary in order to have proper understanding of the relation 
between these value judgments. Otherwise, confusion of their inter-relations will 
result in fallacious conclusions. Hume has provided us a very good example. Apart 
from the fact judgment of the apple which provides information of the judged 
object, the fact judgment of the person’s desire provides information of the criterion 
in the action to reach out for an apple. But the criterion is about what food (taste) 
is good, not about what thing (action) is moral. With such information, the only 
value judgment to be made is whether the apple is good to eat or not. Without the 
morality-related criterion, no value judgment concerning the moralness of the action 
can ever be made, whatever information one has about the apple or the desire. 
Thus it is ill-grounded for Hume to arrive from this instance at the conclusion that 
value judgment like moral virtue cannot be derived from fact judgment. 
Secondly, though the value judgment at hand has another value judgment as 
its third element, if we keep on tracing down along the chain of third elements, it is 
plausible for us to fi nd a fi nal value judgment, whose third element is no longer an 
other value judgment but a fact judgment instead. If this is true to all the cases, then 
the more plausible conclusion should indeed be that, contrary to Hume’s well-known 
law, the value judgment not only can be, but must be derived from fact judgment.
Analyses from the three perspectives lead to the same conclusion. The third 
elements in value judgments, whether they appear at the fi rst sight to be emotions 
or inclinations or values per se, are essentially fact judgments or derived from fact 
judgments. As the third element is the crucial benchmark for the good or evil 
judgment, value judgment is undoubtedly derived from fact judgment. Plus the 
proper cognitive knowledge about the object is also essential for the making of the 
value judgment, we can say value judgment is, not a simple aggregation of, but a 
magical combination of fact judgments. 
The final third element
Hold a sec! Smart people still have something to say: the previous discussions, 
at most, illustrate that, in some instances, value judgments are derived from fact 
judgments. But all these mean nothing to Hume’s law because a crucial and ultimate 
question remains. The question is: why does the judging person take the so-called 
fi nal fact judgment as the criterion for his value judgment? For example, if the value 
judgment that “I ought not to drink and drive” is, after analytical tracing, eventually 
derived from the fact judgment that “drinking alcohol increases the chance of traffi c 
accident”, there is still a question beneath the fact judgment for further tracing, 
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which is why does the judging person take the fact judgment as the criterion for 
value judgment? The core of this question concerns obviously a value instead of a 
fact judgment. So, whatever the answer is, the source of value judgment is still not 
fact judgment but another ultimate value. What are these fi nal third elements or 
fi rst principles? Are they some basic moral values? Human reasonableness? Basic 
form of goods? Natural law?
Internality 
As previously said, value judgment is a kind of measurement to defi ne the 
relation between the judged object and the third element whether or not, or how 
well the object fi ts the criterion of the third element. But value judgment is not 
the only way to perceive the relation, fact judgment can perceive the relation in its 
own way. For example, “drinking and driving endangers traffi c safety”. This is a fact 
judgment and it is also a perception of the relation between “drinking and driving” 
and traffi c safety. In the fact judgment way of perceiving, the judging person stands 
aside, taking an external view to describe the relation as an on-looking observant 
while having no preference or bias to either end of the relation. 
Value judgment perceives the same relation in a quite different way. Instead 
of as an onlooker, value judgment enters into the relation to be a participant of it, 
and stands in the position of traffi c safety to judge the other end of the relation, 
drinking and driving. That’s why traffi c safety is the undoubted fi nal criterion in the 
value judgment’s perception of the relation. Anything against the safety of traffi c 
gets a negative judgment of ought not, while anything for the safety of traffi c gets 
a positive judgment of ought. Therefore, from the fact “drinking alcohol increases 
the danger of traffi c accident” as the third element, the value judgment that “one 
ought not to drink and drive” instead of “one ought to drink and drive” is derived. 
The value judgment maker’s internal position in the relation is called the 
internality. Clearly, it is the internality that makes value judgment what it is. With 
the internality, the judging person mixes himself with one end of the relation and 
make it criterion to measure the other end. This decides the three-element structure 
of value judgment. Though fact judgment can also portray the image of the relation 
between the two ends, it external viewpoint focuses directly on the relation per se 
as the object to judge, without splitting special attentions to the two ends, hence 
its two-element structure. Value judgment, on the other hand, focuses on the two 
ends instead of the relation in between. As the value judgment maker is inside the 
relation, he uses the end of which he stands in shoes as criterion and the other end 
as judged object, thus giving a portrait of the relation in a runaround way. 
The internality not only decides its constitutive structure but is also the original 
power to activate the making of the value judgment and further on the action. 
According to Hume (1978, p. 457), value judgment is active in that it directs the 
actions of the judging person while fact judgment is inactive which cannot exert 
any infl uences on acts. Actually further investigations will show that the value 
judgment is only the transmission shaft between the action and the engine while 
the real activating power is the internality hidden behind the value judgment. And 
if the value judgment activated by the internality is taken as the third element for 
more value judgments in chain, as we have previously seen, then the internality will 
work as ultimate drive to penetrate through all the derived value judgments from 
the fi nal value judgment. 
So in a human action, we fi nd the internality as the actual motivation, while 
value judgment is just the relatively superfi cial exhibitions of the essential internality, 
or the technical mechanism to fulfi ll the mission granted by the internality. Thus 
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the value judgment and the motivation of act are related and separated. John loves 
drinking but he says “I ought not to drink now” since he is going to drive soon. Why 
he restrains himself from drinking? The value judgment alone is not enough, more 
importantly; it is because he is inside the factual relation of drinking and driving. 
Without the internality, solely value judgment is never suffi cient to be activating. 
For example: although he completely agrees that he should not drink and drive, 
John has totally no reason at all not to drink if he is not going to drive. Therefore 
it is not so appropriate for Hume to say that value judgment is active while fact 
judgment is inactive. 
So, without the internality, value judgment alone is in vain, which, just like the 
running wheels lifted up in the air that cannot make the car move, does not activate 
human actions as Hume says. On the other hand, however, once the internality is 
there but without value judgment, human actions will be equally effected as if there 
were value judgment. This is just like when the wheels have been stuck and cannot 
move, a car can still be pushed forward by external forces just as if the running 
wheels move it. 
“The earth rotates around the sun”, for example, is a fact judgment. It is not 
a value to activate human acts. But if the fact judgment is put into the factual social 
relation in medieval Europe, it would be taken as a value instead of fact judgment. 
That’s why Copernicus dared not publish his book until before his death and also 
why Bruno was simply burnt to death. It is not only that the act that the two people 
thought so was taken as a vice, but the judgment per se was also taken as a vice, 
which means a value judgment. Why the fact judgment in essence has transformed 
into a seemingly value judgment is, suffi ciently obvious, because of the factual social 
relation at the time and place12. 
The signifi cance of internality for value judgment should be clearer now. 
When an internal view is taken upon a fact judgment, it can even be changed 
into a value judgment. This might have told us more of the relation between fact 
and value judgments. We have known their structural level distinction while the 
internal/external distinction is even more fundamental, by which the structural 
distinction is decided13.
The internality has also partially answered the question of the ultimate value 
judgment; it is the internality that makes the judging person to take the fi nal fact 
judgment as the criterion. But questions still remain. What is this internality? Is it a 
sort of human reasonableness? Why does the judging person take the internal view? 
The internal view of the judging person is not a subjective choice and 
therefore not another value judgment. The internality is a fact, an objective fact 
that the judging person cannot decide or choose. For example, why does one drive 
a car? It is because he needs (not just want) to travel and the need is prior to the 
value judgment about drinking and driving. Why do people live in group that they 
put themselves into an extremely complicated web of relations? There are many 
hypotheses to answer this question. It is, however, hardly convincing to take this 
as the well-planned rational choice of people and the answer is most likely beyond 
any conscious and subjective value judgment of these relations. It is the pre-value 
12 Apart from medieval Europe, similar things happen everyday even in the modern world. When a witness, 
for instance, gives an objective prescription of the fact that he has seen, the prescription is a fact judgment. 
But if the fact judgment is against the interest of a party in the case, the unfavorable party might possibly 
takes it as a value judgment against him.
13 Another example to show the signifi cance of internality is the onlooker’s value judgment. If John’s close 
friend has died, he might show his condolence to the friend’s family and say: “I know how you feel. We share 
the same feelings”. In fact, due to the actual internalities he has, John cannot share the family’s feelings. He 
can feel the sorrow only as a friend but not as a family member. 
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and pre-reason factors that activate the relation and in turn activate, together with 
human judging power, the value judgment of the relation and the actions under 
the value judgment. 
So the internality is not from human reason or any basic goods; it is decided 
by or is in itself the pre-reason factual need or state. We may call this pre-reason 
fact as human nature or natural law or whatever, but there is one thing for sure: 
it is factual. So the internality, or the fi rst principles for value judgments, is not 
human reasonableness, but the objective fact prior to any human reason, value or 
moral judgments. He is just internally there, like it or not, as everyone was born into 
a society with inevitable social relations with other people and everyone is living 
in the physical world with inevitable relations with the external surroundings. The 
internal view of value judgment is just what the judging person can see from where 
he is, not from where he chooses or from where he ought to be. So the fi nal third 
element as the third element is a refl ection of fact. It is from this fi nal third element 
fl ow out all the value judgments V1, V2, V3, Vk, now we ,therefore, have no problem 
in saying the good fl ows out from the truth. 
Is/ought reunification 
Once inside the relation, a person has two angles of view for the perception 
of the relation. One of them is, of course, the convenient internal view. Since he is 
already a part of the relation, he just takes his position in it as the ultimate criterion 
to judge other persons or objects in relation with him. The judgments thus obtained 
are value judgments, which therefore could be taken as the perceptions of the 
relation from internal point of view. Human perceptive capacity is a wonderful 
thing, it has the ability, when the judging person is actually outside the relation, to 
pretend as if the person is inside the relation and thus to make a value judgment of 
it from an internal point of view. We may call it as the onlooker’s value judgment. 
For example, someone who cannot drive at all may also say: “I ought not to drink 
and drive”. Since the person will never really be inside the relation between drinking 
and driving, this onlooker’s value judgment, as previously said, will not have any 
actual effect upon his acts. 
Thanks to the wonderful perceptive capacity of human beings, the convenient 
internal view is not the only way for people to perceive the relation that they 
themselves are in as parts. Human perceptive device cannot only take an internal 
view when the judging person is outside the relation, they can do the contrary too. 
That is, they have the ability to take a view from outside back upon what they are 
inside. So they not only know “I ought not to drink and drive” but also perceive 
that “Drinking and driving endangers traffi c”. The fact judgment well refl ects the 
relation with the two ends of drinking and traffi c but without the judging person 
standing as a part. Thus the pre-value factual relation works as the base for both 
value judgment and fact judgment to be made. In this sense, we can say fact and 
value judgments share the same source, which is the value-free fact as the common 
fi nal object of judgment. And the distinction between the two is the just the different 
perspectives from which to see the same object. 
Now we are approaching an even more non-traditional conclusion that fact 
judgment and value judgment are not so essentially distinctive. On the ultimate 
level, they are reunifi ed at an objective relation, the external image of which makes 
fact judgment while internal image value judgment. The ultimate relation concerns 
about the fi tness between its two ends, and this fi tness is right the substance 
revealed internally by value judgment. As the fi tness relation between the two 
ends is objective and factual, we can therefore say that value is as objective as the 
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objective fact. The objective value is just the fi tness between the two ends. Since this 
fi tness is also the substance of the relation per se, fact and value judgments share 
the same ultimate essence. Thus we can even say that is and ought are essentially 
the same thing, but with different angles to view it. The stories of an Englishman 
and Newton’s apple might illustrate this well. 
Isaac Newton is standing in front of an apple tree and sees a ripened apple 
falling down. He understands that why the apple falls is the necessary result of the 
internal factor of the ripened apple’s own, and so he says: “The apple falls when 
ripened”. This is a fact judgment, and, if true, is an external descriptive refl ection 
of the objective fact that the apple falls when ripened. Suppose Isaac Newton were 
the apple and he knew the objective fact that the apple falls when ripened, he 
would say: “I ought to fall when ripened”. This is a value judgment, and an internal 
prescriptive refl ection of the same objective fact that the apple falls when ripened. 
This is how fact and value judgments are different from and related with each other. 
Some may fi nd the imagined story weird and unconvincing. But it is easy to 
fi nd in realistic human societies events of the same effect. We can quote an example 
from HLA Hart. A foreigner may report to his friends after his travel to England that: 
“The English stand up when God Save the Queen is played”. This is, if true, a fact 
judgment, external and descriptive. However, suppose the reporter is English, he 
may feel: “I ought to stand up when God Save the Queen is played”. This is a value 
judgment, internal and prescriptive. But both, though through different perspective, 
give certain kind of refl ection of the relation between English persons’ standing up 
and “when God Save the Queen is played”. 
Some may argue that here involves the confusion between natural factor in 
the apple and the cultural factor in human mind. But it is indeed unconvincing to 
insist on essential distinctions between the natural and the cultural. It is certain 
factors inside the apple that lead it to fall down while it is also certain factors inside 
the English person that lead him to stand up. At least in this sense, we cannot see 
any meaningful distinctions between the so-called the natural and the cultural, 
except the linguists’ symbolic fi ctions. Though the factors per se have the differences 
of being natural and being cultural, but the natural/cultural differences are not 
subjective human constructions. Objectively, we do not have suffi cient reason to say 
the differences between the biological factors in an apple and the mental factors 
in one’s mind are in any degree bigger than that between the biological factors in 
an apple and the inorganic factors in a brick14. 
Values of is and ought 
So fact and value judgments are different views upon the same objective fact. 
Ultimately, value judgment, like fact judgment, is derived from objective fact. But 
value judgment is not directly derived from objective fact but through the bridge 
of fact judgment in between. Prior to the making of a value judgment, the judging 
person must fi rst have the fact judgment of the judged object as well as the fact 
judgment of the third element. It is then upon these two fact judgments that 
the value judgment is made. Different people may have different fact judgments 
about the objective fact and accordingly have different value judgments made 
upon the different fact judgments. When fact judgment changes, value judgment 
changes correspondingly. That is why different cultures may mean different value 
14 Some may argue that this will lead to the denial of free will. Actually it will not. The conception of free will 
is also a perception from the internal point of view. In fact judgment we recognize it as the acting person’s 
own internal factor, which has covered the connotation of the concept of free will. 
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judgments as well as different fact judgments. That is also why the development 
of fact judgment promotes the development of value system and further on the 
whole culture.
Value judgment not only has fact judgment as its bridge to its objective 
relation, value judgment per se can also be the object of fact judgment. Since value 
judgment, once made, is also an existence in the external world, it can certainly 
be the object of human perception as long as it gets within the reach of human 
perceptive capacity. Therefore people can make fact judgment of a value judgment. 
The fact judgment of a value judgment principally contains the fact judgment of the 
judged object, the fact judgment of the third element, and the fact judgment of the 
relation in between. For example the idea of the fact judgment of value judgment 
can be of great signifi cance to possibility of descriptive general jurisprudence, which 
we will discuss in detail later. 
Given a judged object, fact and value judgments give different perceptions 
about it. The perception of a fact judgment is to pursue the information about the 
object per se, without that of other interfering objects. Value judgment, on the 
other hand, is not about the object itself, but about its relation with something else, 
i.e. its fi tness with the third element. So whether we need fact or value judgment 
depends on what information we expect about the judged object. In case we want 
the information about the object per se, fact judgment is what we need while value 
judgment cannot provide the knowledge we expect. 
This is essential for moral philosophy or the philosophy of value. When we 
ask the fundamental questions into the ultimacy or the ontology of moral goods or 
other values, what we want is actually the perception about the values themselves, 
thorough and complete. We do not want interferences; we do not want the judgment 
about them by the criteria of some other values. Otherwise, what we have is not the 
perception of the values themselves, but with impurities of some third elements; 
we are not at the ultimacy yet, we are still standing on the presumption of other 
values, which we do not expect and are not supposed to do. So, necessarily, what 
we need here is only fact judgment, the fact judgment of values. And, with fact 
judgment of value, the ultimate source of all values or value judgments, as previously 
proved, can only be the factual relation between a factual object and a factual third 
element, not any form of basic goods or values. 
However, the denial of the possibility of fact judgment of value will result in 
certain kind of the so-called basic goods or values as the source of all the other value 
judgments. And these basic values are supposed to be general and universal. Due 
to the assumption that only the internal approach is appropriate for the perception 
of value, western philosophers are keen on summing up these basic values15. But 
none of these basic or common goods or values seems to have the generality or 
universality as it is claimed to have. Knowledge, according to Finnis, is a basic good 
for everyone, but “䲒ᕫ㊞⍖ (Ignorance is virtuous)” in China has long been the 
philosophy of life for many16. Life is another basic good for Finnis. But life might 
not be a good for those who commit suicide and who wants euthanasia. On the 
contrary, death is a good for them, and so it is with the martyrs and heroes. 
The problem here is the internal view which is essential for value judgment. 
With an internal view, one must assume something general and universal, absolute 
15 John Finnis’ basic goods and Rawls’ principles of justice are examples. 
16 A Christian missionary from US told me “Use your heart not your head to approach God”, be a child, be 
ignorant, and throw away all your knowledge. Just as a lamb can never know the shepherd, you cannot and 
ought not to know God. You can disagree with the missionary, but at least to him in this case, knowledge is 
not a good.
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and nonnegotiable, which works as the third element in the value judgment. But 
the generality and universality is only assumed, often it is not necessarily true. In 
order to have a sound third element as the criterion for value judgment, we need a 
fact judgment for what the third element tries to claim as fact judgment is the only 
way to pursue the truth not to assume the truth like those in value judgments. This 
is why all the theses which give credit to the so-called basic goods as the eventual 
foundation for other value judgments are problematic. This is also why it is only 
fact that can work as the foundation of value judgments. 
And, as previously said, fact judgment is the bridge between the objective 
fact and the use of fact as the third element in value judgment, fact judgment has, 
in some degree, decisive effect upon value judgments made thereafter. Since people 
can have fact judgments with different degrees of truth, they will accordingly have 
value judgments with different degrees of good. The truth decides the good; the 
greater the truth, the greater the good. 
Human reason and perceptive devices 
In the process of achieving greater truth and accordingly the greater good, 
human perceptive devices, of which human reason is one form, plays a signifi cant 
role. It is reason that works to capture the perception of the objective fact, and further 
on the perception concerning the good. But, nevertheless, human perceptive devices, 
including human reason, are only of instrumental instead of essential signifi cance. 
Human perceptive devices are the instruments for fact or value judgments upon 
objective facts, they, therefore, can exert effects on subjective judgments, including 
those of fact and value, and in turn on human acts, but not on the objective fact. 
We have had the metaphor that value judgment between the factual internality and 
human act is like the transmission shaft between the wheels and the move of a car, 
human perceptive devices, including human reason, play the similar role between 
the factual internality and value judgment, which pass on the driving force from 
the engine to the wheels and further on to the car. Human perceptive devices are 
prior to human acts and judgments, but the ultimate objective fact, the engine, is 
prior to anything, including human reason and other perceptive devices. 
Some may argue that human perceptive devices including reason, in a 
degree, are also part of the factual Nature. But in this sense, human reason or 
other perceptive devices are just like the sensory organs of animals or insects. Any 
subjective wills or judgments of people are just like the responses of the animals 
or insects to the surrounding environment, which are just part of the operation of 
the great Nature itself. In order to achieve in this sense a true understanding of 
human reason per se, without any interference from other external elements, we 
can only make fact judgment of it. And the conclusion thus got is already in the 
story of Newton as an apple and the apple as Newton, which means the proper 
understanding of human reason’s role in value is not as a value but as a fact. Thus, 
given human reason as a form of perceptive device, it is also problematic, as Finnis 
thinks Aquinas does, to take human reasonableness as the fi rst principles of value. 
As a fact judgment aims to give a faithful picture of the object just like a camera 
trying to take a picture of the object, we may call the judging power in it refl ective. 
While the judging power it aims to measure the object using the third element as 
a benchmark, we may call the judging power in value judgment measuring. In this 
sense, John Finnis is right in that they are operating in a different way, yielding a 
different logic, but there is no good reason for asserting one is more rational than 
the other. Whether refl ective or measuring, they are both the human perceptive 
devices. The measuring process shall involve the same rational process of human 
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reason as the fact judgment does, let alone fact judgments per se are also involved 
in the process of a value judgment. 
We thus arrive at our conclusions concerning is/ought relation: value judgment 
is derived from fact judgment, and further on from the objective fact. The objective 
fact, which is pre-reason and value-free, is the common source for both value and 
fact judgments, whose difference is only the different points of view upon the 
object fact. While the objective fact for a fact judgment may be a physical object, 
an intangible relation or anything else within the reach of human perception, the 
objective fact for a value judgment is a relation between two things, with one end 
of which as the judged object while the other as the third element. Human reason 
as a form of perception is the technique needed for the generation of fact and value 
judgments, but it is posterior to the ultimate objective fact. 
More evidences 
Though the conclusions above get some ambiguous supports from classical 
Chinese philosophy, they are quite contrarian for western ideas, which therefore 
need to be backed up with more evidences. Luckily, the evidences seem not so 
diffi cult to fi nd. 
Confucius, the great moral teacher in China, could give us wonderful illustrations 
as he often derived his moral teachings right from fact judgments. For example, when 
asked about the virtue of three years’ mourning for parents, Confucius said: “It is not till 
a child is three years old that it is allowed to leave the arms of its parents” (The Analects,
ǉ䆎䇁g䰇䋻Ǌ). In order to give the reason why one ought to mourn his parents for 
three years, Confucius quote a fact that a child cannot be independent from his parents 
until three years after birth. Obviously, this fact judgment is the external criteria for the 
value judgment about what one ought to do after parents’ death. Confucius is deriving 
a value judgment here from a fact judgment as the third element. 
People may argue that this is not yet the fi nal value judgment. The derivation 
(D1) by Confucius from the fact that a child cannot be independent from his parents 
until three years after birth to the value that a child ought to mourn for three years 
after his parents’ death is in itself a value judgment. In this value judgment D1, 
there might be a hidden third element, which might be the more basic principles 
of fi liality, righteousness, or reciprocity. These are not facts, but values, the basic 
values for traditional Chinese moral system. How do these basic values come? Are 
they also derived from facts? Now we need the analytical tracing.
But we will skip all the intermediate stages and go right to the final 
third element. Dong Zhongshu, who is considered as the one to establish the 
Confucianism’s dominance in China, said˖“ҕНࠊᑺП᭄ˈሑপП໽” (All nomians 
of Jen and Yi are from Tian) (Dong Zhongshu, 1989, p. 74); “⥟䘧Пϝ㒆ˈৃ∖Ѣ໽
(The three cardinal principles for King’s way are from Tian)” (Dong Zhongshu, 1989, 
p. 74); “৯㞷⠊ᄤ໿ཛПНˈⱚপ䇌䰈䰇П䘧 (The duties between sovereign and 
minister, father and son, husband and wife are all from the Tao of Yin and Yang)” 
(Dong Zhongshu, 1989, p. 73). The answer we get from Dong is thorough, complete 
and fundamental. The nomians of Jen and Yi, the three cardinal principles for King’s 
way, all the duties between sovereign and minister, father and son, husband and 
wife as mentioned by him here are not the specifi c values concerning only specifi c 
problems of life, they actually give an overall coverage of the whole traditional 
Chinese moral system. Therefore, the answer Dong gives here is the fundamental 
source for the whole traditional Chinese moral system, which might be called as 
the fi rst principles in a western term. What are these fi rst principles then? They are, 
according to Dong, Tian and Yin/Yang. 
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Now we come to the question what Tian (Heaven/Nature) or Yin/Yang is? Some 
people may insist that they are the ontology of both value and fact, not necessarily 
ultimate fact only. However, what happened later to the well-established Chinese 
value system does not seem to suggest a fact-to-value sequence here. Ever since 
the Opium War in 1840, western civilization invaded China with the help of their 
powerful guns. However, westerners have brought not only drugs and blood, but also 
some brilliant ideas about the world, among which we fi nd science. Science is fact 
judgment, which, even according to the philosophy in its birthplace, is not supposed 
to have much to do with morals or values. However, once in China, science, in the eyes 
of many - if not most - Chinese people, had falsifi ed the fact judgments about the 
world traditionally made by classic Chinese philosophy. Yin and Yang were thought 
to be made-up stories, which are illusionary and simply not true. Tian was also not 
what had been thought by traditional Chinese philosophers. That is, the Yin/Yang 
and Tian theses have been negated. But this negation is not because of wrongs in 
any sense of morality or other values, but the falsehood as a fact judgment. And it is 
the falsehood of the fact judgment that resulted in the consequent changes of value 
systems. Since Yin and Yang are no longer true, how can you expect people to keep 
on following the values that are derived from them? So, with the falsifi cation of the 
factual foundation, the traditional Chinese moral system above collapsed, naturally. 
A typical example could be Mr. Luxun, the probably most beloved author in 
modern China’s mainland. Luxun said that, whenever he thought of Confucius, he 
would have the feelings of ridicule or disrespect (Luxun, 1973, p. 80). Why he felt 
so was because the square earth as said by Confucius has been proved to be global 
by the modern western science, and because Chinese people had been defeated by 
the nations of France and England which were not recorded in the “Four Books” 
(Luxun, 1973, p. 80). So, what’s the point of having the Saint like this? What’s the 
point of following his teachings? Besides, as a medical student, Luxun had rich 
knowledge of modern western medicine and science, like the chemical elements of 
H and O in water, like the knowledge of human body. Thus the traditional theories 
of Yin and Yang were convincingly falsifi ed in his eyes. Naturally, the ethical duties 
between sovereign and minister, father and son, husband and wife established upon 
the Yin/Yang thesis were invalidated and rejected by him. And his condemn of the 
traditional ethics as cannibalism becomes quite understandable17.
So, Yin/Yang or Tian, even as the ontology of value, is fi rstly fact judgment 
in itself. When it is still sound and true, corresponding values are well established 
up above. Once falsifi ed, the values collapse accordingly. Same can be found in 
the west. Moral systems in Christian cultures are based on the faith in the biblical 
God. And the faith, fi rst of all, is the belief as truth in the fact of the existence of 
God. This might be why the simple event in the Bible of Jesus’ revival three days 
after the crucifi cation is so important for the preachers and the religion itself as the 
truth of the event lays down the foundation for the divinity of Jesus and further on 
for the existence of God, and then all the commandments and moral teachings of 
Christianity. Such a fact of revival is the cornerstone not only for the religion itself, 
but also for the value systems based upon it in all the Christian societies. 
That may explain why the slightest doubt about the fact problem of God’s 
existence will be a great horror while, on the other hand, the greatest minds in 
17 Luxun is not the only example. Corrupted offi cials in modern China might help as well. According to a popular 
story from the Internet, someone asks a corrupted offi cial: “ Aren’t you afraid that you will be punished and go 
to hell for all the dirty money you have?”. “Hell? Superstitious! There is no such a thing!”, said the corrupted 
offi cial, “I am a materialist, and you need to learn some more science”. The falsifi cation of the fact judgment 
of the hell has also taken away the binding force of the traditional morality. 
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the west have always been keen on proving the seemingly simple truth. Descartes 
for instance claims that he has proved the existence of God with mathematics, 
the story of which always makes my Chinese students laugh. But I call for my 
students’ attention to the signifi cance of the simple fact judgment not only to 
the religion alone, but to the value systems derived therefrom, upon which the 
whole Christian world has been running. Unfortunately, the development of 
modern science seems to have eventually falsifi ed the fact of the existence of 
God even in the eyes of many western people. This might be among the reasons 
why Nietzsche claims the death of God. But it is worthwhile to notice that what 
he claims is the death not the corruption of God, which is the negation of fact 
judgment not value judgment. As the foundation for values, the negation of 
fact judgment will consequently cause the negation of values. In this sense, it is 
obviously inappropriate to say that science has nothing to do with morality or 
values. It is modern science that causes the spiritual crisis shared in China and the 
west in terms of belief and moral values. 
Perhaps the most convincing evidence for ought as derived from is is Hume’s 
own observation. Hume observed that in every system of morality the author 
proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being 
of God, then, of a sudden, the usual copulations of propositions connected by is 
and is not turn to be connected by ought and ought not. This observation demands 
our attention from three perspectives. First, it is “in every system of morality” that 
propositions connected by is and is not are found by Hume. Such a fi nding is not 
likely to be in favor of those who claim the disconnection between is and ought. If 
ought is indeed not derived from is and is does not have any essential function for 
ought, how come is can be found everywhere “in every system of morality”? The 
universal appearances of is in moral systems should show the function of is for ought 
and the function should be necessary and essential. Secondly, we should notice the 
sequence of is and ought. Why do moral philosophers always proceed with is fi rst 
and go on to ought later? Why do moral philosophers establish the being of God 
fi rst and then go on to the discussions about ought later? Can it be for anything else 
other than that only when the truthness of the fact judgment of the existence of 
God is established can people have the basis for the discussion about oughts? In a 
religious society, without the fact of the being of God as the premise, what ground 
shall people stand on to talk of oughts? Isn’t this a typical evidence to prove that 
ought can only be derived from is, that fact judgment is the indispensable ground 
for value judgment? Thirdly, some may argue that God is not only the creator for 
the physical world but also the legislator for the moral world, God is the ultimate 
unifi cation of fact and value. Therefore value is not necessarily derived from fact 
but can be from the value part of God. To this, I may again call their attention to 
the sequence of is and ought. As Hume has observed, before the use of ought and 
ought not, moral philosophers use is and is not fi rst for their talks of God. This shows 
God appears in the system of God fi rst as fact judgment. Even if God is the ultimate 
value, but the value must exist fi rst and then can the rest derived values fl ow from 
the factual existence of it. This again shows ought is derived from is. 
Hume’s observation, therefore, does not seem to support but deny the 
common understanding that ought is not derived from is. This seems to have 
not been perceived for centuries, but is, however, of the fi rst signifi cance. As the 
authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to 
the readers; and I am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the 
vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is 
founded merely on the factual relations of objectives, and is perceived by reason. 
253
Filosofi a Unisinos, 10(3):233-253, set/dez 2009
On truth as the source of good: An is/ought reinterpretation
References 
CHENG, C.Y. 1998. The modernization and transnationalization of Chinese culture. 
Beijing, China Peace Press, 285 p. 
CHU, H. 2006. Hui An Xian Sheng Zhu Wen Gong Wen Ji ǉ᰺ᒉܜ⫳ᴅ᭛݀᭛䲚Ǌो
݁कಯǉㄨ៪ҎϗǊ. Beijing, National Library of China Publishing House, 11026 p.
DONG, Z.S. 1989. Chun Qiu Fan Lu (ǉ᯹⾟㐕䴆෎НǊ). Shanghai, Shanghai Guji 
Press, 102 p.
FANG, Z.H. 2002. Chinese learning v. Western learning: The reinterpretation of 
modern Chinese intellectual histroy. Baoding, Hebei University Press, 411 p.
FUNG, Y.L. 2001. A brief history of Chinese Philosophy. Beijing, Peking University 
Press, 295 p.
FINNIS, J. 1980. Natural Law and Natural Rights. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 425 p. 
GRAHAM, A.C. 2007. Two Chinese philosophers (Chinese version). Zhengzhou, 
Daxiang Press, 277 p. 
HUME, D. 1978. A treatise of human nature. 2nd ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 743 p.
LIANG, S. M.  2005. The essentials of Chinese culture (ǉЁ೑᭛࣪㽕НǊ). Shanghai, 
Shanghai Century Publishing Group, 278 p. 
LUXUN. 1973. The second collection of Qiejieting essays (ǉϨҟҁᴖ᭛Ѡ䲚Ǌ). 
Beijing, Remin Literature Press, 210 p. 
MOU, Z.S. 1997. The character of Chinese Philosophy (ǉЁ೑૆ᄺⱘ⡍䋼Ǌ). Shang-
hai, Shanghai Guji Press, 192 p.
MOU, Z.S. 1936. The senses of the concrete and the abstract of Chinese people 
(ǉЁ೑Ҏⱘ݋ԧᛳϢᢑ䈵ᛳǊ). Cosmos Periodical (ǉᅛᅭᯀߞǊ), 5(2). May 5.
PUTNAM, H. 2006. The collapse of the fact/value dichotomy (Chinese version). 
Beijing, Dongfang Press, 198 p. 
THE ANALECTS.ǉ䆎䇁·䰇䋻Ǌ. 
WANG, Y.M. Chuan Xi Lu (ǉӴдᔩ·ोЁǊ). 
XUNZI (ǉ㤔ᄤ·ࡱᄺǊ).
ZENG, C.H. (ed.). 2009. An introduction to Chinese Philosophy. Changchun, Jilin 
Publishing Group Co., Ltd, 449 p. 
ZHANG, D.N.  1982. Introduction to Chinese Philosophy: Foreword. Beijing, China 
Social Science Press, 614 p. 
ZHANG, T.Y. 1995. Introduction of Pre-Qin Philosophers (“䇌ᄤ⬹䇈”). In: T. ZHANG, 
Lectures on Chinese Learning (ǉ೑ᄺⓨ䆆ᔩǊ), Huadong Normal University 
Press, 174 p.
ZHANG ZAI. Zheng Meng (ǉℷ㩭·໻ᖗǊ).
Submetido em: 31/08/2009
Aceito em: 06/10/2009
